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TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
1.

Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-4(1) (Supp. 1979).

No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two
years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (Supp. 1979).

No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff
gives the prospective defendant or his executor or
successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent
to commence an action. Such notice shall include a
general statement of the nature of the claim, the
persons involved, the date, time and place of the
occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective
defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other
damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney.
Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and
in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint
in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt
requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have
been served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall
be served within the time allowed for a commencing a
malpractice action against a health care provider. If
the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the
expiration of the applicable time period, the time for
commencing the malpractice action against the health
care provider shall be extended to 120 days from the
date of service of notice.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (Supp. 1976).

In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the
legislature to provide a reasonable time in which
actions may be commenced against health care providers
while limiting that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and
settlement of claims.
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1986, her claim, initiated on March 4, 1988, is absolutely time
barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below.

This case came on regularly for hearing on May 7, 1990;
however, because neither party appeared, the Honorable Boyd
Bunnell, Seventh Judicial District Court Judge, ruled oral
arguments had been waived.

Judge Bunnell ruled in favor of

defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment finding specifically:
The service of the first intent to commence action was
timely, but when the plaintiff failed to request the
prelitigation panel review within the time limitation
as specified, that notice became null and void.
The service of the second notice of intent to
commence action was beyond the two-year statute of
limitations as required for the commencement of this
type of action.
(Ruling on Defendant Munsey's Motion for Summary Judgment
attached as Addendum "C".)

On June 1, 1990, the Court entered an

order reflecting there was no genuine issue of any material fact
relative to plaintiff's failure to comply with the statute of
limitations and therefore defendant was entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law.

(Bunnell's Order, attached as

Addendum "D".)
On June 14, 1990, plaintiff moved for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

In her petition for a new trial, plaintiff made

many of the arguments she is making on this appeal; however, none
of these arguments were made at the time the Motion for Summary
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Judgment was being considered by Judge Bunnell.

Accordingly, on

June 15, 1990, the trial court judge denied plaintiff's motions.
The Court noted:

"The plaintiff in her memorandum attempts to

reargue matters already determined by the court, and further
attempts to assert additional matters of constitutionality of
statutes that should have been presented during the prior determination.11

(Ruling on Motion for New Trial and for

Reconsideration, attached as Addendum "E".)

This appeal followed

the trial court's determination of finality.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Dr. Munsey treated Dana Gramlich for a nervous disorder over
a short period of time in early 1985. His office notes are
attached as Addendum "F". His notes reflect the last time he saw
the patient was on March 14, 1985.
On January 5, 1986, a seizure led plaintiff to the care of a
neurosurgeon who diagnosed her brain tumor.

The tumor was

excised on January 9, 1S86, and, to date, has not recurred.
(Medical Records of Dr. Peter Hielbrun.)

It is undisputed that

plaintiff's brain tumor was diagnosed on January 5, 1986.

She

alleges in her Complaint that Dr. Munsey missed the diagnosis in
March, 1985.
In her first Notice of Intent to Commence an Action, dated
December 21, 1987, plaintiff's attorney stated unequivocally that
defendant's negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on
January 5, 1986.

Plaintiff failed to follow-up with a timely
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request for prelitigation review as mandated by § 78-14-12(2),
Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989).

Consequently, defendant filed a

Motion for an Order denying plaintiff's tardy request.

(Motion

for Order denying prelitigation review attached as Addendum "G".)
Plaintiff then filed an amended notice of intent.

On this

second notice, plaintiff's attorney attempted to change the date
plaintiff allegedly discovered the negligence of the defendant.
This new notice was followed immediately by a prelitigation
hearing request.

Following this request, a hearing was scheduled

and held on May 3, 1988. The rules of the Department of Business
Regulation, Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing as
well as the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act prohibit any appeal
or challenge to the findings of the prelitigation panel.
Finally, plaintiff's Complaint was filed on June 15, 1988,
five and a half months after the first invalid notice and over
three months after the amended notice was filed.
Clearly, plaintiff's second notice, dated March 4, 1988, was
filed over two years after the plaintiff's brain tumor was diagnosed, treated and excised.

The surgeon who successfully removed

the tumor testified during his deposition that often the first
sign of a tumor such as plaintiff's is a seizure.
Dr. Heilbrun at pages 7, 16.)

(Deposition of

The neurosurgeon testified plain-

tiff would have required surgery no matter when the tumor was
recognized and that there was no way to say to any degree of
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medical probability that her outcome, which has to date been
problem-free, would have been altered by an earlier diagnosis.
(Heilbrun Depo., pp. 9, 14-15, 16.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff should not be allowed to frustrate the avowed
design of Utahfs Rules of Civil Procedure which "shall be
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action."
Procedure.

Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil

The plaintiff attempts to take advantage of a

"window," but she misreads the statute.

To comply with the

statutory guidelines, she needed to follow her first Notice of
Intent to Commence an Action with the statutorily mandated
request for prelitigation review.
Notice to Commence Action.

Instead, she filed an Amended

Accordingly, the first notice is

invalid because no timely request for prelitigation review was
made and no complaint was filed before the expiration of the
statutorily prescribed 120 days.

The second, amended notice is

barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, the trial court
properly granted defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.

Such a

determination should not be disturbed on appeal.
Finally, the constitutional issues raised are untimely and
inappropriate.

They should form no basis for this Court's

decisions on review.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A

-

Plaintiff's First Notice of Intent Expired Because
Plaintiff Failed to Timely Request Prelitigation Review
as Mandated by the Utah Statute.

Plaintiff's first Notice of Intent was rendered invalid for
failing to comply with § 78-14-12(2) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989).
The Notice was dated December 21, 1987. The Request (attached as
Addendum "H") was dated March 2, 1988. This Request was untimely
as it was filed beyond sixty days in violation of section
78-14-12(2) which requires:
The party initiating a medical malpractice action shall
file a request for prelitigation panel review with the
Department of Commerce within 60 days after the filing
of a statutory notice of intent to commence action
under Section 78-14-8."
In a timely fashion, defendant opposed the tardy request for
prelitigation panel review.

A second Notice of Intent was filed

and a second request for prelitigation review dated March 11,
1988 was filed with the second notice.
attached as Addendum "I".)

(This second request is

However, it was never made clear one

way or the other by the Department of Business Regulations
whether the scheduled hearing was in response to the second
request or whether the Motion for Order Denying Request for
Prelitigation Panel Review was granted or denied.
a hearing was held on May 3, 1988.
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In any event,

The findings of these prelitigation panels are non-binding
and advisory in nature.
(Supp. 1985) states:

Specifically, § 78-14-14 Utah Code Ann,

"There is no judicial or other review or

appeal of the panel's decision or recommendations."
Consequently, defendant could not, even had he wished to, object
to the panel convening or to its determinations.
In Utah, no malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff complies
with the statutory time lines encoded in the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act.

Thus, for any medical malpractice claim filed

after July 1, 1985, the claimant must meet the prelitigation
panel review jurisdictional requirement as a condition precedent
to commencing litigation.

Thus, the statutory language of the

Utah Code establishes jurisdictional requirements that must be
fulfilled before a court will recognize a claimant's action.
Further, the Utah legislature has specifically stated the
consequence of noncompliance with the Health Care Malpractice
Act:

The complaint cannot be filed.
The [prelitigation panel] proceedings are informal and
non-binding, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation.

Section 78-14-12(1)(c) Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1989).
The language of the statute is unequivocal.

The Utah

Supreme Court has noted:
There are numerous instances in which the law requires
fulfillment of a condition precedent before the filing
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of a complaint. A failure to comply with the condition
may result in a dismissal.
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979), citing Costello
v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S. Ct. 532, 5 L.Ed.2d 551
(1961) .
For failure to comply with the clear mandate contained in
the Health Care Malpractice Act, plaintifffs first Notice of
Intent fails as a matter of law since no timely request for panel
review was made.
Plaintiff erroneously attempts to rely on language which
would extend the time to file a Complaint.

Specifically,

§ 78-14-8 states:
If the notice [of intent to commence an action] is
served less than ninety days prior to the expiration of
the applicable time period, the time for commencing the
malpractice action against the health care provider
shall be extended to 120 days from the date of service
of notice.
Here, plaintiff missed this deadline as well since the Complaint
was not filed for over five months after the first notice of
intent.

Based on the undisputed facts, the first notice is

invalid as a matter of law.
B.

Plaintiff's Amended Notice of Intent Was Filed Over Two
Years After the Plaintiff Discovered the Inlurv.

The amended or second Notice of Intent was properly followed
by a timely request for panel review.

However, the amended

notice is absolutely time barred by the applicable two-year
statute of limitations since plaintiff knew, or should have
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known, she suffered an injury at the time her brain tumor was
properly diagnosed and excised.
Thus, by January of 1986, plaintiff had all the facts
required by Utah courts to conclude that her injury could be
attributable to the negligence of the defendant.

There is no

justification for waiting over two years before commencing malpractice litigation.

Consequently, plaintiff's claims are barred

as a matter of law by the applicable statute of limitations.
The relevant section of the Health Care Malpractice Act
codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1953, as amended) states:
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two
years after the plaintiff or patient discovers or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever first occurs.
The adoption of this discovery rule gives patients two years
to bring a claim against a physician.

In order for the statute

to begin to run, the Utah Supreme Court requires that the patient
know, or, through the use of reasonable diligence should have
known, that she had sustained some injury and that the injury
suffered can be attributed to negligent conduct on the part of
the defendant.

Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979).

Case law interpreting the Foil decision has narrowly defined
the parameters of "legal injury."

In Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F.

Supp. 152 (Utah 1984), reversed on other grounds, 801 F.2d 368
(10th Cir. 1986), a medical malpractice action was brought
against the examining physician to recover for injuries suffered
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by an infant due to an alleged misdiagnosis.

The court held

plaintiff's action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations since the parent of the infant was aware of the facts that
would have led a reasonable person to conclude that the cause of
action existed more than two years before filing suit.

It was

the plaintiff's position that she had no medical training and was
led to believe by other doctors that the defendant's alleged
negligence could not be legally proven.

But the court ruled:

"That argument is without merit and confuses 'legal injury' with
a legal conclusion of negligence."

598 F. Supp. at 154.

The Harqett court went on to explain:
Under Foil v. Ballinqer and its progeny, a legal determination of negligence is not necessary to start the
statute of limitations. Rather, the crucial question
is whether the plaintiff was aware of the facts that
would lead a reasonable person to conclude that he may
have a cause of action against the health care provider. Those facts include the existence of an injury,
its cause and the possibility of negligence.
Id. 155, cites omitted, emphasis in original.
Similarly, in Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, Inc.,
773 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah App. 1989), the court held that the
statute began to run once the patient discovered an injury and
attributed its cause to the negligence of the defendant.
Plaintiff's second Notice does not fall within a "window"
period:

It was not served "less than ninety days prior to the

expiration of the applicable time period," Section 78-14-8, Utah
Code Ann. (Supp. 1979); rather, it was served after the statutory
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deadline for initiating a claim had expired.

Here, since plain-

tiff filed the first Notice less than 90 days prior to the expiration of the applicable time period, she would have an extension
of 120 days from the first Notice to file a complaint, not to
file a second Notice.
facts of this case.

Thus, this section does not apply to the

By definition, an "intent to commence" is a

ninety-day notice of a prospective plan to file a lawsuit; it is
only the Complaint which "commences the malpractice action" as
required by the statute.
Furthermore, to allow a plaintiff to take advantage of the
extension described in § 78-14-8 by repetitively filing "notices"
frustrates the stated purpose of the Utah Health Care Malpractice
Act:
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a reasonable time in which actions
may be commenced against health care providers while
limiting that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and
settlement of claims.
S 78-14-2, Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1976).
Because plaintiff discovered her injuries and attributed
their cause to the defendant by January of 1986, the "Amended"
Notice of Intent to Commence Litigation dated March 4, 1988 was
not timely filed and the plaintiff's claims are absolutely time
barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
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Should the plaintiff argue that she did not know the full
extent of her alleged injuries until much later, the two year
statute of limitations would still apply to bar her claim.

Such

an argument was addressed in both the Harqett case, supra, and in
Kaqoc v. Hooker, 796 F.2d 377 (1986), in which the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the Utah District Court ruling that the
plaintiff's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations per Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-4(1) (1953).

The Maqoc court

stated:
[P]laintiffsf counsel argues that [plaintiff did not]
know the full extent of defendants' negligence, which
was only learned later. The district court rejected
his argument, as do we. To adopt such reasoning would,
in practical effect, wipe out the statute.
Id. at 379, emphasis in original.

See also, Hove v. McMaster,

621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980) (holding there is no requirement to wait
for the pain to be diagnosed before the two-year statute of limitations will bar a medical malpractice action); Reiser v. Lohner,
641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) (holding belief condition complained of
may be temporary rather than permanent did not prevent application of two-year statute of limitations to bar plaintiff's
claim); Guiley v. Hammaker, 640 P,2d 664, 667 (Or. 1981) ("we
would be abrogating the policy of the statute of limitations if
we were to hold that a plaintiff with notice of both an injury
and its cause would be excused from bringing an action until he
had determined the full extent of the consequences of the wrong
done to him; the order of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's
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complaint was correct"); Steele v. Organon, Inc., 719 P.2d 920,
922 (Wash. 1986) ("generally, if the plaintiff is aware of some
injury, the statute of limitations begins to run even if he does
not know the full extent of his injuries"); and United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S 111, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979)
(wherein the Supreme Court expressly disapproved circuit decisions holding that accrual does not occur until a claimant has
knowledge that the acts causing injury might constitute medical
malpractice).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENIED
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
summary judgment is available and "shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
In the views of both the United States Supreme Court and the
Utah Supreme Court, summary judgment is regarded not as a disfavored procedural short-cut but rather as an integral part of
the rules of procedure designed to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of litigation.

Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986); McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d
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431 (Utah 1980); Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).
Summary judgment is not only appropriate, but is mandated against
a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish an essential element of his case.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 2548.
Based on the facts presented to the trial court, there can
be no question that the First Notice of Intent was not followed
within sixty days by the statutorily mandated request for panel
review.

Further, the only evidence before the court was plain-

tiff's allegation defendant negligently failed to diagnose her
brain tumor; it was undisputed the tumor was diagnosed by
January 5, 1986 and was successfully removed on January 9, 1986.
Thus, there is no evidence to rebut the conclusion that the
second, amended Notice of Intent was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations as the surgery to excise the brain
tumor constituted sufficient grounds for a reasonable person to
be put on notice that her prior treating physician had missed the
diagnosis.

The trial court properly found there was no genuine

issue as to any material fact and properly concluded defendant
was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Further, there is no basis for reconsideration or for a new
trial.

Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties is grounds for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order unless refusal
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to take such action appears to the court inconsistent
with substantial justice.
Plaintiff makes a belated attempt to salvage her constitutional claims by framing her motion as one for reconsideration.
However, the cases she cites in support for this proposition do
not support her contentions.

Specifically, none of the cases

cited by plaintiff allow a party who has lost a motion for summary judgment to, by way of a motion for reconsideration, insert
constitutional claims which were not properly raised below.
Thus, while a motion for a new trial following summary judgment
is procedurally correct, plaintiff cannot thereby be excused for
failing to raise constitutional issues at the time the summary
judgment motion was pending.

Moonlake Elec. v. Ultra Systems W.

Const., 767 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah App. 1988); Ferris v. Jennings,
595 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1979).
As there is no evidence before the Court which adequately
raises a genuine issue of fact concerning either plaintifffs
failure to comply with the time restrictions of the Utah statute
with regard to requesting a prelitigation hearing, filing a
Complaint or complying with the statute of limitations, summary
judgment was proper and should be affirmed.

Salt Lake City Corp.

v. James Construction# Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Further, the refusal to grant a new trial is a matter left to the
discretion of the trial judge and the decision can be reversed
only if it is shown the judge abused that discretion and acted
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unreasonably.

Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988).

Here, the trial court's rulings were supported by uncontroverted
facts.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF CANNOT NOW RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTIONS WHICH WERE NOT TIMELY RAISED BELOW.
It is well settled that this Court will not address issues
raised on appeal or on a motion for a new trial which were not
raised at the trial level. Thus, the constitutional issues
raised by plaintiff for the first time on appeal cannot be
addressed.

Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Topik

Ve Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); Inslev Mfc. Corp. v.
Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986).
Along with being untimely, the constitutional concerns
raised by plaintiff are inapplicable.

The avowed legislative

purpose for treating the class of health care providers differently from other defendants is stated in the Health Care
Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) § 78-14-2,
which provides as follows:
The legislature finds and declares that the number of
suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care has
increased greatly in recent years. . . . In view of
these recent rends and with the intention of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are
producing in the public's health care system, it is
necessary to protect the public interest by enacting
measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide health related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a
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mechanism to insure the availability of insurance in
the event that it becomes unavailable from private
companies.
Thus, the Health Care Malpractice Act was premised upon the
need to protect and insure the continued availability of health
care services to the public.

The legislature "exercised its

discretionary prerogative in determining that the shortening of
the statute of limitation would insure the continued availability
of adequate health care services."

Allen v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah 1981).
Further, the Supreme Court of Utah has specifically upheld
the constitutionality of the statute of limitations applicable to
medical malpractice claims.

In Allen v. Intermountain Health

Care, Inc., supra, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 78-14-4
does not violate the equal protection of the law requirements of
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24. The Supreme Court
further held that said Section is not an unconstitutional
"special law" in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article VI,
Section 26.
Similarly, in Harqett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah
1984), reversed on other grounds, 801 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1986)
the Utah District Court upheld the constitutionality of Section
78-14-4 and determined that the statute does not violate equal
protection of laws; does not violate due process of law; and does
not violate the open court provisions of the Utah Constitution,
Article I, Section 11. Harqett, applies to the facts of this
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case in that it involved a medical malpractice action against a
doctor for an alleged delay in diagnosis.

The Tenth Circuit on

appeal did not address the constitutionality of the statute,
because the question of constitutionality was not timely raised.
The Court affirmed that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the
Health Care Malpractice Act statute of limitations where the
action was brought more than two years after the plaintiff discovered "facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude
that he may have a cause of action against a health care provider."

801 F.2d at 371.

Finally, decisions reached by both the Utah Supreme Court
and the Utah Court of Appeals, decisions which were reached after
other statutes of repose were challenged, have upheld the twoyear statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose
encoded in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Section 78-14-4,
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).

See, for example, Sorensen v.

Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Dechamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d
471 (Utah App. 1989).

Thus, even if the constitutional issues

were properly and timely raised, they would have no basis.
CONCLUSION
Based on the undisputed facts, the trial judge properly
granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

There is no

genuine issue as to the fact plaintiff failed to request a prelitigation panel hearing within sixty days of her first notice of
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intent as required by law.
in time.

She then failed to file her Complaint

Therefore, the first Notice of Intent is invalid.

The second Notice is barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Reasonable minds could not differ and conclude other

than plaintiff's claim for delayed diagnosis of a brain tumor was
"discovered" when the proper diagnosis was made.

This Court

should therefore affirm the lower court's rulings.
DATED this itfik

day of February, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Elliotl: ST- Williams

^tl^l^NU^^

By

Elizabeth King
Attorneys for Defendant/
Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed to appellant, postage prepaid, this
day of February, 1991.

Elizabeth Kino

J
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ADDENDA
A

Notice of Intent to Commence Action

B

Amended Notice to Commence Action

C

Ruling on Defendant Munseyfs Motion for Summary
Judgment

D

Order

E

Ruling on Motion for New Trial and for
Consideration

F

Dr. Munseyfs Office Records

G

Motion for Order Denying Request for Prelitigation
Panel Review

H

First Request for Pre-litigation Panel Review

I

Second Request for Pre-litigation Panel Review
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NOTICE OF INTENT TO COMMENCE ACTION

TO:

Jay P. Munsey, M.D.
82 North Main
Moab, Utah 84532
Richard Home, D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreck Drive
Moab, Utah 84532

You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that
this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business
during the time period in question.

Pursuant to the cited statute, you are also given

notice of the following:
1.

Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each of

you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich.
2.

Persons Involved.

The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich.

The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the
named individuals.
3.

Date. Time and Place of Occurrence.

The negligence occurred from

March, 1985, through January 5, 1986. The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at his
office at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office
at the address stated above.

The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on

January 5, 1986.
4.

Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct.

In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face

and a general unwell feeling. On March 16 Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot
pack.

On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether

the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that that was not
the case.

In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munsey at his office.

She again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her
to a neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he
advised her to continue taking it.
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the
same symptoms described above.

Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there

might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve.
Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months.
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor.
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but she was resuscitated by her husband.
It was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986.
The failures of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they each owed to
her.
5.

Nature of Injuries.

known at present.

The full extent of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not

Her injuries include, however, the following:
2

She is required to

take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her
subject to an increased risk that any children she had would have had birth defects.
She also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear
causes her on-going distress and suffering.

She has not regained her strength or full

use of her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the
surgery.
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this -<V

day of December, 1987.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the
foregoing Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that the statements contained
therein are true to the best of her knowledge, information and belief.

DU^g

MA/C^AZP

DANA GRAMLICH
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this ill

. day of December, 1987.

jeZ
NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at

•t

oM
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AMENDED NOTICE TO COMMENCE ACTION
TO:

Jay P. Munsey, MD.
82 North Main
Moab, UT 84532
Richard Home, D.C
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab, UT 84532
You are hereby given notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1987) that

this office has been retained by Dana Gramlich and that she intends to commence an
action against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, Moab Family Chiropractic
Clinic, and any other business under which either of you may have done business
during the time period in question.

Pursuant to the cited statute, you arc also given

notice of the following:
1.

Nature of the Claim. This claim is for the negligent failure of each of

you to diagnose and properly treat a brain tumor suffered by Mrs. Gramlich.
2.

Persons Involved.

The victim of the negligence was Dana Gramlich,

The claim of negligence is made against Jay P. Munsey, M.D., Richard Home, D.C, the
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic, and any and all other entities or persons under which
the named individuals did business or which would be liable for the negligence of the
named individuals.
3.

Date. Time and Place of Occurrence.

The negligence occurred from

March, 1985, through January 5, 1986. The negligence of Dr. Munsey occurred at his
office at the address listed above. The negligence of Dr. Home occurred at his office
at the address stated above.

The negligence was discovered by Mrs. Gramlich on

January 20, 1988, after receiving a report from Dr. Warren F. Gorman.
4.

Circumstances of the Occurrence and Specific Allegations of Misconduct.

In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich began to experience a numbness in her fingers and face
and a general unwell feeling. On March 16, Mrs. Gramlich called Dr. Munsey who told
her that she probably had a pinched nerve and advised her to lay down with a hot

pack.

On the same day, Mrs. Gramlich again called the doctor and inquired whether

the symptoms could be the result of a brain tumor, and was assured that was not the
case. In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Munscy at his office.

She

again inquired whether she might have a brain tumor and asked that he refer her to a
neurologist, and he stated that she did not have a brain tumor and dismissed her
concerns as frivolous. Dr. Munsey prescribed medication for circulation, but it did not
help. Mrs. Gramlich advised Dr. Munsey that the medication was not working, and he
advised her to continue taking it.
In March, 1985, Mrs. Gramlich was examined by Dr. Home with respect to the
same symptoms described above.

Mrs. Gramlich also stated her concern that there

might be a brain tumor. Dr. Home examined Mrs. Gramlich, took x-rays, assured her
that she did not have a brain tumor and proceeded to treat her for a pinched nerve.
Mrs. Gramlich continued with the treatment from Dr. Home for several months.
Dana Gramlich was treated by Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home periodically during the
rest of the year 1985. They assured her she had no brain tumor.
On January 5, 1986, Mrs. Gramlich experienced a severe seizure during which
her heart stopped and she stopped breathing, but was resuscitated by her husband. It
was subsequently discovered that Mrs. Gramlich had a brain tumor, and surgery to
remove the tumor was performed on January 9, 1986.
The failure of Dr. Munsey and Dr. Home to diagnose Mrs. Gramlich's brain
tumor was negligent and a departure from the duty of care which they owed to her,
5.

Nature of Injuries.

known at present.

The full extend of Mrs. Gramlich's injuries is not

Her injuries, however, include the following:

She is required to

take medication to reduce the possibility of future seizures. The medication made her
subject to an increased risk that any child she had would have had birth defects. She
also has an extreme fear of the possibility of a subsequent seizure, which fear causes
2

her on-going distress and suffering.

She has not regained her strength or full us£.of

her extremities and will continue to have permanent disability as a result of the
surgery.
GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this

Lr

p.

day of March, 1988.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Dana Gramlich
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Dana Gramlich, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that she has read the
foregoing Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action and that the statements
contained therein are true and to the best of her knowledge, information and belief.

IfU <LtrAcL

DANA GRAMLICH
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this y

:c

- day of March, 1988.

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

Residing at:

3
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DANA GRAMLICH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]i
)
;

RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

;

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D.,
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC
CLINIC,
Defendants.

|i
)
]
;

Civil Nos. 5686

The defendant, Jay P. Munsey, has filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment contending that there is no genuine issue of
material fact relative to plaintiff's failure to comply with
the Statute cf Limitations that is applicable to this action.
The plaintiff has filed an objection to the granting of the
Motion, and both parties have submitted their Memorandums of
Legal Points and Authorities and supporting documents and
affidavits.
Oral arguments were requested and set for May 7, 1990,
and neither party appeared at the time set so the Court finds
that oral arguments have been waived, and rules on the Motion
as here and after stated.
The undisputed facts show that Dr. Munsey commenced
treating the plaintiff for a nervous disorder in March of 1985,
and did not diagnose a brain tumor during that treatment period.

That the plaintiff suffered a seizure on January 5,
1986, and underwent surgery for the removal of a brain tumor
on January 9, 1986.
On December 21, 19^7, plaintiff's attorney served
defendant Munsey with a Notice of Intent to Commence Action,
and stated that the negligence was discovered on January 5,
1986.
The plaintiff failed to request a pre-litigation
review as specified in Section 78-14-12(c) within the 60 days
as mandated in that Section.
The plaintiff then served a new Notice of Intent to
Commence Action on defendant on March 4, 1988, which stated
that the negligence was discovered on January 20, 1988.
The question of when the two year Statute of
Limitations begins to run has recently been reviewed by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Deschamps v. Pulley, 123 Ut.Adv.Rep.
34.

It is quite clear from a review of that case and the legal

principles set: forth that the plaintiff in this case knew, or
should have known, on January 5, 1986, and certainly no later
than January 9, 1986, that she had suffered an injury and that
this injury was caused by negligence.
It would be obvious to any reasonable person at that
time that the Doctor had failed to properly diagnose her
nervous system disorder and that there was the possibilty, and
even the probablity of negligence.
2

The service of the first intent to commence action was
timely, but when the plaintiff failed to request the
pre-litigation panel review within the time limitation as
specified, that notice became null and void.
The service of the second notice of intent to commence
action was beyond the two year Statute of Limitations as
required for the commencement of this type of action.
THEREFORE, the Court grants the Motion for Summary
Judgment as to defendant Jay P. Munsey, and authorizes an order
dismissing this case as to him.
The Attorney for this defendant is directed to prepare
findings and a formal order in accordance with this opinion.
DATED this

^

day of May, 1990.

//

BOYD BUNNELL, District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RULING ON DEFENDANT MUNSEY'S MOTION
by depositing the same in the United

States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Elliott J. Williams
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Don R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys at Law
120 East 300 North
Post Office Box 778
Provo UT
84603
Thomas J. Erbin
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys at Law
City Center I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City UT
84111

DATED this /3//£ day of May, 1990,

Secretary
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DANA GRAMLICH,

]i
Plaintiff,

vs.

O R D E R

;
;

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,
Defendants.

]
;
]
)
]

Civil No. 5686

Defendant James P. Munsey, M.D.'s Motion for Summary
Judgment having been fully briefed, and both parties having
waived oral arguments originally scheduled for May 7, 1990,
and plaintiff being represented by her attorney, Don R.
Peterson of Howard, Lewis & Petersen, and defendant having
been represented by his attorneys Elliott J. Williams and
Elizabeth King Brennan of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, and
the court having reviewed the Memoranda of Points and
Authorities and supporting documents and Affidavits and being
fully advised, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted since there is no
genuine issue of any material fact relative to plaintiff's
failure to comply with the statute of limitations applicable

to this action and defendant is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law as reflected by this Court's ruling on
this matter dated May 15, 1990.
FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above
entitled action be and the same hereby is dismissed with
prejudice as to the defendant Jay P. Munsey, each party to
^^/^

bear its own costs.
DATED this

/ "

day of June, 1990.

BY THE COURT:
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

O R D E R

by depositing the same in

the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Dor. R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys at Law
Delphi Building
120 East 300 North
P. 0. Box 778
Provo UT
84603
Elliott J. Williams
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Richard H o m e , D.C.
MOAB FAMILY CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab UT
84532
DATED this /s*T~

day of June, 1990.

Secretary
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DANA GRAMLICH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]i
>
;>

RULING ON MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL AND
FOR RECONSIDERATION

;

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., RICHARD
HORNE, D.C., and MOAB FAMILY
CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC,

1
]
]
Civil No. 5686

Defendants.

}

The plaintiff has filed a motion for a new trial
under Civil Procedure Rule 59(a), and for the Court to
reconsider its prior ruling granting summary judgment to
defendant Munsey, and states that she is relying on Civil
Rule 54(b).
Neither one of these Rules have any application to
plaintiff's Motion since there was no trial, and certainly a
motion for new trial could not be granted.

Rule 54(b) has no

application since there is no rule providing for a motion to
reconsider a matter that has already been fully determined.
The plaintiff in her memorandum attempts to reargue
matters already determined by the Court, and further attempts
to assert additional matters of constitutionality of statutes
that should have been presented during the prior
determination.

For these reasons, the Court hereby denies the
Motion for a New Trial and for any reconsideration.
DATED this

/Jz

day of June, 1990.

BOYDfeUNNEJ^T,District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
FOR RECONSIDERATION

RULING ON MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
by depositing the same in the United

States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Don R. Petersen
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys at Law
120 East 300 North
P. O. box 778
Provo UT
84603
Elliott J. Williams
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT
84145
Richard H o m e , D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab UT
84532

DATED this

/ffZ^O day of June, 1990,

Secretary
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Respondent,
Jay P. Munsey, M.D.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH
DANA GRAMLICH,
Petitioner,

MOTION FOR ORDER DENYING
REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION
PANEL REVIEW

v.
JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D., and
RICHARD HORNE,-D.C,
Case No.
Respondents.

Respondent, Jay P. Munsey, M.D., requests the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing to deny petitioner's
Request for a Prelitigation Panel Review dated March 2, 1988,
for the reason that the petitioner has failed to comply with
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (1953, as amended) which requires
the filing of a request for panel review within 60 days after
the filing of a statutory notice of intent to commence action.
Petitioner served the Notice of Intent to Commence Action by
mail on or about December 21, 1987, more than 60 days prior to
the filing of petitioner's Request for Prelitigation Panel
Review.

DATED this

jf*

day of March, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

BY

Jfc

ELLIOttA J. WILLIAMS
Attorney©Ofor Respondent,
Jay P. Munsey, M.D.

-2-

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.

being duly sworn,
CORINNE M. GLASS
says that he/she is employed in the law offices of Snow,
Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for respondent,
Jay P. Munsev, M.D.,
herein; that he/she served the attached Motion for OrdeiT
Denying Request for Prelitigation Panel Review
before the Division of Occupa(Case No.
tional & Professional Licensing, Department of Business
Regulation) upon the parties listed below by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Attorneys for Petitioner:
Don R. Petersen
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North Street
Post Office Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603

and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the 14th
day of
March
, 198J3 .

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
, 198 8 .
March
f^u

My Commission Expires:

14th

dai

2

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah

TabH

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345

Our File No. 17,857

Attorneys for Plaintiff
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH
DANA GRAMLICH,
REQUEST FOR PRE-LITIGATION
PANEL REVIEW

Petitioner,
vs.

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D. and
RICHARD HORNE, D.C,
Respondents.
COMES NOW Dana Gramlich, by and through her counsel, and hereby requests a
Prelitigation Panel Review of the medical-negligence action which Dana Gramlich is
initiating against Dr. Jay P. Munsey and Dr. Richard Home, as more fully described in
Dana Gramlich' Notice of Intent to Commence Action, filed pursuant to the Utah Code,
a copy of which is attached hereto and by reference incorporated herein.
Respondents were served by certified mail the Notices of Intent to Commence
Action, copies of the receipts/of
:eipts/ot which are attached hereto.
DATED this "<

day of March, 1988.

*^^>£^£
DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and xrorrcct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this (T

day of March, 1988.

Jay P. Munsey, MD.
82 North Main
Moab, Utah 84532
Richard Home, D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab, Utah 84532
Utah State Department of
Business Regulation
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

SECRETARY

Tab!

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone. (801) 373-6345

Our File No. 17,857

Attorneys for Plaintiff
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING
STATE OF UTAH
DANA GRAMLICH,
Petitioner,

REQUEST FOR PRE-LITIGATION
PANEL REVIEW

vs.

JAY P. MUNSEY, M.D. and
RICHARD HORNE, D.C,
Respondents.
COMES NOW Dana Gramlich, by and through her counsel, and hereby requests a
Prelitigation Panel Review of the medical-negligence action which Dana Gramlich is
initiating against Dr. Jay P. Munsey and Dr. Richard Home, as more fully described in
Dana Gramlich's Amended Notice of Intent to Commence Action, filed pursuant to the
Utah Code, a copy of which is attached hereto and by reference incorporated herein.
Respondents were served by certified mail the Notices of Intent to Commence
Action, copies of the receipts of which are attached hereto.
DATED this SS^Saw

of March, 1988.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attornevs for Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
lid, this
the following, postage prcpai

day of March, 1988.

Jay P. Munscy, M.D.
82 North Main
Moab, Utah 84532
Richard Home, D.C.
Moab Family Chiropractic Clinic
478 Millcreek Drive
Moab, Utah 84532
Utah State Department of
Business Regulation
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45802
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

SECRETARY

